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Abstract
The Stability and Growth Pact clearly failed to prevent the euro crisis. We contend that
the failure was due largely to the ability of the Member States to undermine the Pact’s opera-
tion. The European Commission served as a “watchdog” to monitor fiscal performance. The
Member States themselves, however, collectively had the ability to change the content of the
reports for individual states. We confirm the expectation that powerful Member States had the
most success in undermining the role of the Commission. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find
supporting evidence for our argument that governments with euroskeptic populations behind
them were also more successful in weakening the Commission’s warnings. These results have
broader theoretical implications concerning which mechanisms explain country-specific out-
comes under a shared rule. Another contribution is the creation a new dataset of European
Commission assessments of Member State economic programmes and Council of Minister
revisions.
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Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty set guidelines for what macro-economic goals European Union Member
States would need to reach to qualify for participation in the coming common currency, with deficit
and debt targets the most visible. Initially, the expectation was that only a few countries would be
able to participate. When it became clear that there would be an expanded Eurozone, which would
include not only core countries like Germany and France but more peripheral countries like Spain
and even Greece that had traditionally run large budget deficits, there was growing concern that
European-level rules were needed. Otherwise some governments would be tempted to run fiscal
policies that could become unsustainable and leave the other Member States with the unpalatable
choice of either bailing out the troubled government or letting it suffer from the consequences of a
default. The Member State governments therefore agreed to a Stability and Growth Pact meant to
avoid this outcome. Clearly, the need for financial packages for multiple Member States during the
euro crisis means the Pact failed. This paper explores why the Pact failed, and it focuses especially
on its institutional design.
Ongoing research examines how institutional design is related to compliance and the enforce-
ment of rules and we build on this literature. Scholars have shown that there are significant benefits
to flexibility in rules. The argument is that, under conditions of uncertainty, countries have a hard
time committing to rules. A lack of flexibility constrains countries even further and, as a result,
countries only agree to shallow commitments. Alternatively, rule flexibility allows countries to
make deeper commitments, which addresses their commitment problem (Johns, 2013; Kucik and
Reinhardt, 2008; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002).1 In the European context, scholars
have also indicated that domestic institutions can both help and hinder compliance with EU level
rules (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010; Koehler and Ko¨nig, 2015; Ko¨nig and Ma¨der, 2013; Richard and
Caraway, 2014). While rule flexibility may allow states to make deeper commitments, Member
1A similar logic follows with escape clauses which allows for temporary deviations thus ensuring greater flexibility
(see Rosendorff and Milner (2001)).
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States also vary in the extent to which they can exploit flexibility. In other words, the degree of rule
flexibility may not apply equally across all Member States. This article reports the first empirical
evidence that both Member State voting power and domestic level euroskepticism is systematically
associated with weakening (rather than breaking) EU level rules.
When are some governments successful at weakening the application of the rules they have
agreed to at the international level? This paper documents the selective weakening of the assess-
ments for Member States under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) both prior to, and during, the
euro crisis. While “growth” is part of the title of the SGP, its primary goal is to keep deficits low to
minimize the likelihood that a fiscal problem in one Member State affects another. The weakening
of the assessments under the Pact meant that the main tool of the European level to prevent larger
deficits and the buildup of debt levels in Member States was defanged. The ultimate causes to
the crises are of course many and complex, and they include a number of factors highlighted by
others in this volume such as international and external costs, policy announcements, and concerns
about migration (see Bernhard and Leblang; Genovese, Wassmann and Schneider and Walter in
this volume).
Yet, there are three ways that this weakening contributed directly to the crisis. First, it meant
that several large and/or euroskeptic Member States probably entered the crisis with weaker public
finances than had they followed the original Commission recommendations. Second, given that
we find that even small, euro-friendly states had the Commission’s text weakened when the big
and/or euroskeptic states were receiving milder EU-level surveillance too, countries like Greece
and Ireland that later received aid packages, also received weaker surveillance while other countries
weakened and edited the Commission’s recommendations. Finally, one can also speculate about
the indirect effects on Member State behavior. Those Member States that did not receive aid
package had to pay for them. The fact that large states and especially those with euroskeptic
populations entered the crisis with weaker finances meant that they were less likely and, possibly,
less able to agree to debt restructurings because of the consequences for their own public finances.
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In order to measure and explain the weakening of the assessment criteria, we examine the “pre-
ventive” arm of the SGP, which requires every European Union Member State to submit annual
macro-economic programmes to a supranational body, the European Commission, for evaluation.
Those programmes include information on deficits, debts, and the economic growth trajectories
of Member States. The Commission, in turn, writes a report on each Member State that consti-
tutes draft text for the intergovernmental Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN,
or Council) for a formal statement to the Member States. The key benchmark of the SGP is that
Member States should have a budget deficit of three percent or less. In this paper, we refer to
the Commission’s power to comment on national programmes and make concrete recommenda-
tions as its “watchdog” function. The Commission may also recommend “corrective” measures.
The Council, based on an initial recommendation from the Commission, may deem a Member
State with deficits above this figure an “excessive deficit” country. If a Member State ignores the
Council’s ruling, the Council, again with initial Commission recommendation, can decide to fine
a non-complying country. In practice, in the lifetime of the Pact to date (1998 through 2015) the
Commission has not recommended fines and the Council has not imposed them. An important
reason why there have been no fines, we argue, is that Member States succeed in blocking critical
text against them from the Commission early in the process. The “preventive” arm sets up the
“corrective” arm; no action against a Member State can begin unless the Council identifies clear
issues first.2
As we show below, some Member States systematically weaken the Commission’s assessment
whereas others do not. We document large variation in the Council’s editing of Commission eval-
uations of Member States across countries and over time. The question that this paper addresses
2In terms of actual performance, the Stability and Growth Pact did not succeed in keeping budgets “close to balance
or in surplus” since its introduction in 1999. Two large founding members of the European Community, France and
Germany, were especially visible in their violation of the Pact in 2002 and 2003. The Council repeatedly ignored the
Commission’s advice, and the Commission took the Council to the European Court of Justice. The outcome of the
court case did not materially affect the overall institutional setup—it still left the Member States themselves, voting
through the Council by qualified majority, to decide whether to impose the Commission’s recommendations.
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is therefore, what types of countries are successful in weakening the assessments of them? Bor-
rowing insights from the literature on judicial politics and literature on partisanship and elections,
we examine whether or not Member State power and euroskepticism helps to explain why some
countries weaken the assessments while other countries do not. We further examine whether or not
the partisan hue of the government and the election cycle helps to explain weakening and editing.
In this paper, we find that Member States with certain characteristics, by weakening the original
Commission assessments, eroded the power of the European Commission in its role as a “watch-
dog.” Thus, in the case of the SGP, weakening the Commission assessments lowered Member
States’ commitments to the EU and made it easier for powerful and euroskeptic Member States
to pursue uncooperative strategies (see also Chapman et al. (2015); Copelovitch (2010) who find
similar results in other domains).
To measure the extent of changes to the Commission’s assessment of Member States and to
explain the variation in those changes, this paper presents a new dataset constructed from human
coding and computer textual analysis of existing Commission reports on Member State Stability
and Convergence Programmes and the changes the Council of Ministers made to them. Using this
new data, we examine whether Member State power, euroskepticism, and elections help explain
whether the Council changed the Commission’s recommendations. As a preview of our results, we
find that countries with the largest voting power on the Council (10 votes prior to the Nice Treaty,
29 votes after) are more likely to receive favorable edits to the Commission’s original text. The
same is true for countries with relatively euroskeptic domestic populations–they are more likely
to have the Council change the Commission’s original assessment of it. Finally, countries are
more likely to receive weakened recommendations and there is more editing of them when other
Member States are receiving the same treatment. We conclude from our analysis that powerful
Member States and Member States with euroskeptic domestic populations were able to receive the
necessary number of votes in the Council to undermine the watchdog function of the European
Commission, which undermined institutional oversight mechanisms that may have lowered the
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debt levels of several Member States especially during “good times” and left them less exposed
once the crisis was underway. This aspect of our theory leads to an interesting implication we
explore further in the conclusion—Member State governments may have incentives to encourage
more euroskepticism among their populations so that they have better bargaining outcomes at the
European level.3
The Stability and Growth Pact
Before explaining Member State behavior under the Stability and Growth Pact, it is necessary to
explain how it worked and which actors were involved. The Maastricht Treaty provided the road
map to create a common currency and an independent central bank to regulate it. While fiscal
policies were to remain the domain of Member States, the Treaty anticipated the need for some
sort of macro-economic policy coordination.
The European Monetary System crisis in 1992-1993, combined with a general worsening of
budget deficits across the Union, heightened concerns about how Member States would perform
once the Economic and Monetary Union began. Two of the so-called Maastricht criteria focused
on fiscal policy and set reference values of a general government deficit no larger than 3% of GDP
and general government debt burden no larger than 60% of GDP. The Commission used these
values, in turn, to judge whether countries met the requirements to join the Euro Area. In practice,
the emphasis in the run-up to the introduction of the euro was on the deficit figure, and Member
States had to get their deficits at or below 3% if they wanted to adopt the euro.4 However, there
were only vague provisions for what to do once the euro was created. A state with a fiscal crisis
could hurt all members of the Euro Area, and the remaining countries could subsequently find it
in their best interest to assist this state. Consequently, there seemed little to prevent states from
3Thank you to Ben Ansell and David Samuels for encouraging us to develop this point.
4For more details, see Hallerberg (2004), Chapter 2.
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relaxing their fiscal stances once they joined.5
These concerns led to the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact, to which the Member States
agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 (see Heipertz and Verdun (2010) for more detail
about the Pact’s creation). All states were expected to have budgets that were “close to balance” or
in surplus over the medium-term. This means that they were to adjust their balances according to
the economic cycle – in economic good times they were to run surpluses, while in bad times they
could run deficits. The Commission then had the responsibility to review each programme, and to
make recommendations to the ECOFIN Council on whether the programme met European goals
and whether the goals set in the programmes were realistic, given domestic conditions. ECOFIN
would have to approve the Commission’s recommendation by qualified majority vote of all Mem-
ber States, which meant that “countries that ‘sinned’ retained the right to vote and needed only a
few additional countries prospective sinners among them to block such steps” (Schuknecht et al.,
2011, pg. 9).6
Perhaps the biggest shock to the Pact in the initial years was the behavior of two of the founding
members of the European Union, France and Germany. They had problematic deficits beginning
in 2002. The Commission recommended an “early warning” to Germany in 2002, but the ECOFIN
Council did not pass it, and an informal agreement reached with Germany meant that Chancellor
Schro¨der avoided getting such a warning in a national election year. In autumn 2003, the Commis-
sion judged that the deficits in France and Germany were excessive and that they would continue,
and it attempted to begin the sanctioning process against each Member State. The ECOFIN Coun-
5Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty was judged as a “no bailout clause” because it stated that neither the Union
level nor the other Member States were liable for the commitments of other governments. There was concern, however,
that this was not a credible position, and indeed, the financial packages for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in 2010 and
2011 confirmed this fear.
6The corrective arm followed from the Commission’s assessment of a given state’s domestic policy. If it judged
both that an excessive deficit existed and that a state had not made any progress in eliminating it, the Commission
could recommend to the Council that the state make a non-interest-bearing deposit with it of up to 0.5 percent of GDP,
depending on the size of the deficit. If the Member State continued to neglect necessary reforms, the deposit could
become a fine.
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cil, however, balked at following the Commission’s recommendation. The Commission’s response
in January 2004 was to take ECOFIN to the European Court of Justice. In its judgment, the Court
ruled that the Council could not suspend a procedure without the Commission’s recommendation
(Morris, Ongena and Schuknecht, 2006, pg. 17-8), but this was a hollow victory–no additional
action was taken against France and Germany.
There was a clear sense both in the academic and policy communities that something was
wrong with the Pact, resulting in a slew of reform proposals (see Begg et al. (2004); Schelkle
(2005); Schuknecht (2004)).7 The Member States themselves agreed to a concrete reform in March
2005. Under the revised Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), more factors were explicitly consid-
ered when determining whether a country had an excessive deficit, such as if spending fostered
international solidarity or if it promoted the unification of Europe.8 Member States also set their
own medium-term objectives, which could include the future fiscal effects of major structural re-
forms in their calculations. Once a state was found to have an excessive deficit, it could receive
extended deadlines so that it had a longer period to correct the deficit than before the revision.
Countries experiencing negative growth were exempt, whereas the previous requirement for auto-
matic exemption was a decline in economic output of 2 percent of GDP.9 In the end, the Pact was
weakened.10
In summary, the process under the Stability and Growth Pact is more flexible than a simple 3
percent deficit rule, and yet, the core procedure has remained the same. The Commission evaluates
every Stability and Convergence Programme and issues a report where it can point out where it
7The best summary of the proposals appears in Fischer, Jonung and Larch (2006) appropriately-titled paper “101
Proposals to Reform the Stability and Growth Pact. Why so Many?”
8The clause on “international solidarity” was widely seen as a way to mollify France, which wanted defense
spending to be exempt, while “European unification” would allow Germany to include the costs of German unification.
9An excellent review of the changes in the Pact appears in Morris, Ongena and Schuknecht (2006).
10A further reform came during the euro crisis. The so-called “Six Pack” routinized the “preventive” part of the SGP
through a new “European Semester” (see Fabbrini (2013)). It also put more emphasis on a debt level of 60 percent or
below, not just on the 3 percent deficit target. Perhaps most importantly for this article, it changed the decision-making
rules – see the Appendix for further details.
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finds that the given Member State has an issue. These texts, however, are not the final decision
– the ECOFIN Council has to approve each one by qualified majority (through 2011), and the
Council could (and did) change the Commission’s text. Conveniently for our purposes, the various
texts at the different stages of the process are publicly available. In fact, the debate between the
Council and the Commission are embedded into textual changes and edits, which makes systematic
analysis of the texts useful for extracting data.
Political Determinants of Weakening and Editing
The European Commission evaluates the macro-economic policies and macro-economic perfor-
mance of every government. Once the evaluation is complete, the Commission reports the evalu-
ation in the form of a textual document and gives it to the Council. For this paper, if the Council
accepts the Commission’s evaluation unchanged, then we say that the Council (on behalf of the
Member States) is abiding by the rules. If the Member State changes the text, then we examine
whether the Member State succeeds in weakening the textual substance and/or changes the textual
phrasing. Weakening and editing the Commission’s recommendations is important because the
Council, by augmenting the Commission’s evaluation, is intervening in the oversight mechanism
that the Commission is tasked to perform.
Why do governments care about what the European Union says about them in the first place?
Can all Member States weaken and edit the Commission’s recommendations or can only a sub-
sample of countries amend? Why does weakening and editing vary across countries and over time?
It is important to note that the final document is a “Council recommendation” to a given govern-
ment, which supersedes whatever the Commission has written before. A negative recommendation
from the Council leaves the government open to criticism from both the press and the opposition.
But, as we show in this paper, governments vary in their their ability to change the Commission’s
textual document and also vary in their sensitivity to what the “watchdog” writes. This paper offers
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the first look at the political determinants of changes to the recommendations.
We focus on the “preventive” arm of the Pact and we measure the variation between the Com-
mission assessments and final European Council opinions of the Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes. The empirical section goes into further detail, but we consider two dimensions: whether
the Council weakens the substantive message of the Commission’s assessment and whether the
Council edits the language of the recommendations. Weakening, therefore, is when the Council
(as the representative of the Member States being evaluated) changes the evaluation of the Com-
mission such that the evaluations are substantially less stringent. As a second measure, when the
Council edits the language of the texts such that the textual phrasing of the assessment is different
from that initially proposed, we call this editing.
Our explanation for why we see variation in the weakening and editing of the Commission’s
recommendations borrows logic from the judicial politics literature on separation of powers and
the comparativist literature on elections. Like in theories of courts where judicial functions are
constrained by other branches of the government, we assume that the European Commission op-
erates with political constraints imposed upon it from the Council of Ministers. Thus, the Com-
mission’s ability to make recommendations is dependent on the power of the Member State and
the public support it is afforded (Staton, 2010; Vanberg, 2005). In particular, we expect that as
Member State power increases so too can the ability for the Member State to change what the
Commission writes about it in the first place. We also note, however, that the Commission also
has the means to increase its power especially when public support for the EU is high. Thus, an
increase in euroskepticism in the domestic population of a given Member State should weaken
the relative position of the Commission and strengthen the relative position of the Member State.
Alternatively, a decrease in euroskepticism in a given Member State should increase the relative
position of the Commission. Finally, Member States may have different sensitivities in or near an
election and are expected to be particularly sensitive to what the “watchdog” writes in an election
year than during other times. Therefore, another political reason we may expect to see variation in
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weakening and editing has to do with elections. Thus, according to our framework Member State
power, country-specific euroskepticism, and elections are all possible political determinants that
might help explain the extent and with what frequency a Member State will weaken and edit the
Commission’s recommendations against it.
In addition to these factors, we also account for other explanations prominent in the literature.
In particular, we examine whether the partisan hue of the government matters, whether economic
conditions matter, and also whether shared common shocks prompt Member States to behave in
ways similar to one another. In each case, we discuss below the logic of the argument, highlighting
the empirical predictions for how these factors relate to amending the Commission’s evaluation.
The following section then offers an empirical test of these determinants. As a highlight of our
findings, we find that large Member States and euroskeptic Member States are positively associated
with weakening the Commission’s recommendations and editing the text that the Commission
writes about them. We also find that during the euro crisis, the propensity for weakening and
textual editing went down, but that the profile of the Member States that engaged in weakening
and editing holds throughout the period.
3.1 Member State Power
When examining multilateral lending and conditionality, scholars have found that powerful coun-
tries exert significant influence (Thacker, 1999) and that state power shapes the size and the condi-
tionally of loan disbursements (Copelovitch, 2010). We see two ways to conceptualize the concept
of “power” in the European context. One focuses on the main Member State players, while the
second focuses on the formal voting rules that provide the relative weights for every Member
State. The first approach is consistent with Stone’s observation in his discussion of France and
Germany’s behavior under the Stability and Growth Pact that “the rules of the Pact are difficult
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to enforce against powerful countries” (Stone, 2011, pg. 118).11 Applying this logic to our set of
dependent variables, powerful states might be more likely to weaken and edit the Commission’s
recommendations because the potential punishment they face is less than punishments faced by
small states. That is, what can the European Commission do if Germany wants to amend the
Commission’s recommendations? In contrast, if Portugal receives specific recommendations for
adjustments to its budget policy, it may be more vulnerable to pressure from the European Com-
mission. It is also worth considering, however, that large Member States like France and Germany
have a more difficult time complying with the Pact’s three percent deficit rule, which arguably has
an impact on the behavior outlined here. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that large Member
States (always) get (exactly) what they want (see for example Buti and Pench (2004); Fatas and
Mihov (2003)).
This logic then begs the question about whether a strategic Commission would choose not to
highlight large Member States in the first place. If the Commission were perfectly constrained by
the wishes of large Member States, the Commission would make recommendations only for small
states or draft recommendations that Member States accept. Empirically, however, we observe that
the Council frequently changes the Commission’s texts for large states, suggesting that even large
Member States do not get what they want from the Commission. While this brings up the question
of whether large states would get even stricter recommendations if they were not so powerful, it
suggests that, if the European Commission were perfectly constrained, we would get a null or neg-
ative sign on the coefficient for political power in our analysis – large states do not need to ask for
changed Commission texts for them because the Commission would have written texts the large
states wanted from the beginning. The other extreme is one where the European Commission is
perfectly unconstrained by the Member States. In this case, the Commission would write what-
ever the Commission wanted and the Member States would attempt to change the Commission’s
11Similarly, Schure and Verdun (2008) break Member States into ”small,” ”medium,” and ”large” groups and argue
that the size of Member States affects the amount of discretion they want to give to the European Commission.
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assessment to the best of their ability. This would not explain, however, why the Commission gave
less stringent recommendations leading up to the euro crisis. Thus, it seems that Member States,
even large states, are at least partially constrained by what the Commission does and equally, the
Commission is at least partially constrained by the Member States.12 13 Our expectation is that
large states manage to weaken, and to change, the Commission’s text on them more frequently
than small states.
Rather than expect “big” states to get their way while “small” states do not, a second approach
is to measure relative power according to the formal voting rules for approving a recommendation
to a given Member State. There are four separate voting regimes over our time period. In the
first, 1998-2002, it is the Treaty of Amsterdam rules. Under this regime, the largest state has 10
votes and the smallest state has 2 votes. The second voting regime is from 2003-2008, or under
the Treaty of Nice. This Treaty introduced a so-called “triple majority” as the definition of QMV.
The next voting regime is 2009-2010, or Lisbon. Under these rules, the Commission only needs a
qualified majority of the relevant set of Member States’ votes. Finally, another regime was in place
as of 2011. According to these rules a Member State needed a qualified majority to block what
the Commission wants rather than QMV to pass it. It takes a few large states, or a combination
of a large and a few small ones to block changes to the Commission’s texts. In this paper, we
initially follow Stone with a dichotomous categorization of state power. In the robustness section
we also check for whether or not each voting regime matters (see also Schure and Verdun (2008)
12There is evidence that the Commission engages in such strategic behavior in cases it brings to the European Court
of Justice. That is, it presents the cases it expects to win, (see Carrubba (2005); Fjelstul and Carrubba (2015)) however,
whereas in writing the assessment criteria, the Commission has to write something on every country and the guidelines
for what types of report the Commission writes is somewhat standardized.
13This is the baseline model, and if it explains everything other possible explanations are not relevant. This goes in
particular for the argument that interaction in the Eurogroup among ministers constitutes peer pressure, and if there
is enough pressure on offenders in this off-the-record arena then the offenders will reform their ways. We would like
to emphasize that we know of no academic piece that makes this argument, but discussion in Brussels and elsewhere
on the utility of the Eurogroup focuses on peer pressure to resolve disputes. It may very well be, of course, that peer
pressure is useful for smaller issues, but that the more visible compliance or non-compliance under the Stability and
Growth Pact would not be subject to peer pressure.
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and details in the Appendix on differences in the formal voting rules over time).
3.2 Public Support and Euroskepticism
Rather than focus only on the dynamics of voting within the Council, there are relevant variables
outside the Council that affect whether the Commission gets its original text. We expect that public
support for the EU helps to explain to what extent the Commission can prevail against the wishes
of the Member States. Like the Member States, we assume that the Commission would like to
write recommendations according to its own preferences, which, we assume, occurs when it can
perform its role as a “watchdog.” We also assume that receiving support from the Member State’s
domestic population can help bolster the Commission’s strength relative to the Member State. In
particular, we associate EU level public support for the Commission, which is how much or how
little the domestic population supports EU level institutions.
Arguments usually assume that citizens want their governments to honor their treaties. Chau-
doin (2014b), however, finds in a study using a survey experiment that voters worry about keeping
to a treaty only when they do not have a strong preference over a given policy: a voter who op-
poses free trade would prefer that her government not comply under a trade treaty. In another
paper, Chaudoin also finds that domestic populations are more likely to be sensitive closer to elec-
tions and that this behavior induces governments to behave strategically with voters (Chaudoin,
2014a).
While most of the previous empirical literature has examined this in the context of trade, such
a theory should also apply to the case of the European Union. We know that voters have different
opinions across Member States on the “treaty” itself. Some, such as Ireland, have populations that
were, on average, euro-optimists (at least before the crisis), while others like the United Kingdom
had more euroskeptic populations. Because the treaty here relates to the project of European in-
tegration, we expect that Member States with citizens who are generally euro-optimists are more
likely to want leaders to follow what the European Union says. In fights with the European Com-
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mission, a population may be more likely to side with the Commission where there is enthusiasm
for European integration. In contrast, in euroskeptic Member States, we expect the reverse – gov-
ernments are more likely to fight to change negative Commission assessments knowing that in any
showdown with the Commission the body is unpopular.
3.3 Elections
In addition to voters having different preferences, governments may also have different sensitivities
to their domestic populations over the electoral cycle. Governments are presumably more sensitive
to what populations think of their performance and may not want Commission criticisms of them
during elections. Moreover, there may be more “bad” behavior for the Commission to complain
about in an election year, as governments may try to boost the domestic economy by spending more
and/or cutting taxes. Heipertz and Verdun, in particular, argue that electoral considerations were
especially prominent in the original design of the Stability and Growth Pact and so they may also
matter in explaining textual changes to the Commission’s recommendations (Heipertz and Verdun,
2010). This is the domestic story we explore in our main set of results, with the expectation that
there is more editing of Commission texts in election years.14 15
A summary of our predictions is in order. As a reminder of the order of play, Member States
14There are additional domestic factors we consider in the robustness section. There is a developed literature on
Member State compliance under European law. The predictor for behavior in many of these studies is the position the
Member State took prior to passage of the given law. Thomson, Torenvlied and Arregio (2007) consider the impact
of the negotiation stage on the implementation stage, with the focus on directives and subsequent infringements and
delays. Such directives must be transposed into national legislation. They find no evidence of country-specific effects,
but they do find that countries that opposed the directive during its passage are more likely to face an infringement
case. Similarly, Ko¨nig and Luetgert (2009), in a large-n quantitative study, find that countries that fail to transpose
their directives on time were more likely to have been opposed during passage.
15Given that France and Germany pushed through the Stability and Growth Pact, the previous literature would
suggest that these Member States would be more likely to comply. Yet these countries were widely seen as the first
to break the Pact. This behavior suggests that country positions in the mid-1990s when the Stability and Growth
Pact was originally passed are not a domestic reason why a government would be more likely to push for changes in
Commission assessments. At the same time, the prediction would be the opposite of the one based on the size of the
state, that is, France and Germany should be more likely to comply, and as a robustness test later in the paper with
explore this argument in more detail.
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submit either convergence or stability programmes yearly to the European Commission. The Com-
mission, in turn, evaluates the programme and submits an assessment to the ECOFIN Council. The
Council then decides whether to accept the Commission’s evaluation as-is, strengthen the evalu-
ation, or weaken it. In addition to the direction of changes, the Council also decides with what
intensity to edit the Commission’s text. Finally, once handed the new text by the ECOFIN Coun-
cil, the government then decides whether to comply with an explicit recommendations. Given
the theoretical expectations outlined above, in the next section we evaluate the following expected
relationships.
When Member States have oversized power on the Council of Ministers, they can more easily
act against the preferences expressed in the European Commission’s recommendations. As a result,
we argue that large Member State are more likely to change the Commission’s recommendations
in a direction more favorable to the Member State (i.e. weakening). Alternatively, small Member
States cannot do this as easily. Our first testable hypothesis is therefore:
Hypothesis 1: Big Member States will have more edited, and weakened, texts than
small Member States.
It is not only the Member States that have a stake in the recommendations, however. We argue
that when public support for the Commission is high the European Commission is better able to
perform its watchdog function than when public support for the Commission is low. We therefore
expect the following:
Hypothesis 2: Countries with domestic populations that are more euroskeptic will
have more edited, and weakened, texts when the Commission has lower domestic sup-
port than when the Commission is afforded greater public support.
Finally, we also expect that Member States are more sensitive to what the Commission writes
in an election year. Similarly, governments may engage in stimulating the economy so there may
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be more reasons for the Commission to write more stringent recommendations. This suggests our
final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Because of election concerns, Member States in an election year will
be more sensitive to what the Commission writes about them and they will have more
edited, and weakened, texts.
Research Design and Analysis
4.1 Dependent Variable
We examine variation between the European Commission assessments and European Council opin-
ions of the Stability and Convergence Programmes between 1998/1999 and 2012/2013. The coun-
tries in the study consist of the EU-15.16 One might wonder why we include the three countries
that chose not to join EMU, namely Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We see these
states as interesting sources of variation and as possible checks against sample selection bias. Euro
out countries must submit convergence programmes yearly, and those programmes undergo the
same review as the stability programmes that the Eurozone members face. As “outs,” they are
not subject to the same possible sanctions that Eurozone members face, and in particular, they are
not subject to possible fines, so it may be that they do not face the same incentives. By including
them in the statistical analyses, we can empirically assess whether or not the behavior of the “in”
countries is different from the “out” countries.
While our focus is on the EU-15 because these are the original Member States at the beginning
of the Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union, which introduced this monitoring procedure for
16Countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
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all Member States, to be clear that our findings are common after other countries joined we report
results from an expanded EU-27 sample in the robustness section that follows.
As mentioned, we develop two new measures that account for disagreements between the
Commission’s assessments and the wishes and opinions of the Member States, as reflected by
the Council. The first measure examines the direction of Member State amendments and reports,
specifically whether editing by the Member State made the Commission’s amendments weaker or
left the text the same. The second measure tracks the frequency that Member States change the
Commission’s text. Together, these new measures capture both the direction and also the intensity
of amendments.
Weakening: Using human coding of Member States’ edited Commission documents, we mea-
sure the direction of the amendments between the Commission’s assessments and Council’s opin-
ions and put them into two categories: 1. “No change”– there is no noteworthy or substantial
variation (defined more precisely below)17 2. “Weakening”– the Council Opinion has placed less
stringent demands or in general is less critical of a country programme than the Commission as-
sessment.
Before one accepts the validity of the measure, a few words about coding are in order. We do
not consider statements that are substantively similar yet vary in the level of detail.18 Omissions
in the statement are considered substantively significant if the Commission holds a country to a
specific outcome but the Council does not. Treatment of omissions is especially relevant because
there is variation in the length and detail in various reports. Finally, we do not record a distinction
in the magnitude of weakening; if there is a perceived change in one direction or the other in
17We also coded cases where there was a ”strengthening.” There were 28 such cases across the EU-15, which were
comparatively rate (12 percent of cases), and we combined them with the null cases.
18For example, for Greece 1998/1999, the Commission indicated that “structural reform is needed in order to im-
prove the efficiency of the Greek economy, particularly in its large public sector.” The Councils response was as
follows: “The Council welcomes the structural reforms included in the programme which are geared towards the
labour market, the social security system and the wider public sector. The Council urges the Greek Government to
implement them as scheduled and pursue further the reform effort in order to enhance the potential and efficiency of
the Greek economy.” This case was coded as no significant change.
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the statement, we simply record it as such. Commission and Council documents are classified as
having a weakening, a strengthening, both a weakening and a strengthening, or no change in a
given year. Table 1 provides examples from each class.
Given these provisos, our first, hand coded dataset includes 224 annual Commission and Coun-
cil reports on Member State programmes.19 Figure 1 “Weakenings by Country” shows the distribu-
tion of weakening by Member States over the sample period. There are 67 instances of the Council
opinion weakening the Commission assessment. This amounts to approximately 30 percent of
the observations, suggesting that weakening is common.20 Especially striking is the clustering of
weakened Council reports. While the Commission’s fight with France and Germany certainly got
the most press attention in autumn 2003, most states received lighter Council comments that year
than what the Commission first proposed in their original report. Also noteworthy is that at least
two states received a weaker report in every year but 2006. The lack of cases of weakening in the
most recent years is also noteworthy, especially after the 2011 reforms and the crisis period.
There is also clear variation by Member State. The total number of weakening varies from
a high of 11 (France) to a low of 1 (Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland and Spain). Collectively,
France and Germany had nearly 26 percent of all cases of weakening, despite constituting around
14 percent of the dataset. While this relationship is perhaps unsurprising, the surprise is that many
states received lighter comments from the Council. The “out” states of Denmark, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom have proportional numbers; they constitute 22 percent of the weakening and they
also represent 20 percent of the cases.
Editing: While the direction of changes depicts how Member States oppose the Commis-
sion’s evaluations, another equally important measure is the frequency or intensity of editing to
19Our total dataset has 225 rows with one missing value of weakening for Denmark 2002 and 36 missing values for
our second dependent variable, edit distance. We check to make sure that missing data is not skewing our estimates by
using multiple imputation in Amelia.
20We also considered whether the Council on balance strengthened, rather than weakened, the Commission text.
There are such 28 instances, or about 12 percent of observations. A majority of states have one such case. For the
purposes of the analysis that follows, we treat strengthening cases as “no change.”
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the Commission’s evaluations. In order to measure the frequency that a Member State opposes
the Commission’s text, our second dataset constructs a metric of the Member State’s editing.21
To do this, we use automated textual analysis. First, we find the instances of textual differences
between the Commission and the Council’s text using textual comparison software. Second, exam-
ining only the changed text, we calculate the Levenshtein distance metric for each edit made. The
Levenshtein distance metric is a measure that computes the minimum number of single word dele-
tions, insertions, or substitutions that are required to match the new text to the old text (So¨rensen,
2007). For example, if the Council edits the initial recommendation from “2010” to “2010 in view
of the uncertainty connected to the economic downturn,” then the Levenshtein distance metric is
10 because there are 10 word insertions necessary to transform the old text to the new text. The
Levenshtein distance is commonly used in linguistics, including spelling algorithms, and in sta-
tistical models to evaluate language similarity. The textual distance measure is particularly useful
here because it picks up word changes in the text, even if small, between the Commission and the
Council reports.22
Second, after calculating the distance metric for each edit per country document (there are for
example over 5000 edits in any given year), we sum the total number of Levenshtein distance mea-
sures per country-year. As seen in Figures 1 and 2 and like the measure for weakening, editing of
Commission documents varies substantially not only across time but also across countries. Coun-
tries such Germany, Italy, and France tend to have, on average, higher edit intensity than other, less
powerful countries. This pattern is analogous to the observed pattern for weakening.
In addition to the raw numbers, reported by the dash lines, Figure 2 illustrates the trend in
textual editing and the trend in weakening together on the same plot reported by the solid lines so
21The sample includes the same time period as before with all EU-15 Countries from 1998/1999 to 2012/2013.
22Another possibility is to calculate micro changes, such as changes to characters, or alternatively, macro changes
such as changes to the number of sentences in paragraphs. Measuring word changes is most effective because words
can account for small and potentially meaningful additions to text, while simultaneously, not being too sensitive to
cosmetic edits such as changes from British to American spelling and punctuation.
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that we can observe the similarity and the differences between the measures. One important source
of variation between the measures is the differences in the timing of their peaks; the weakening
measure peaks earlier than the edit intensity measure. The benefit of looking at the direction and
the intensity over time and across countries is that it allows us to capture changes in the use of this
particular form of bargaining, and highlights the changing relationship between the Member States
as represented by the Council, and the Commission.
One potential problem with the Levenshtein distance measure is that the distance measure
does not measure lexical similarity between sentences. For instance, consider two sentences with
the same number of words but slightly different meanings such as: “we should expect a 2 percent
increase” and “it’s likely that a 2 percent increase.” This example has a calculated distance measure
of zero because it has the same number of words and no substitutions have been made. Despite
this, however, additional statistical analysis and the correlation of the Levenshtein distance measure
with weakening suggests that both measures capture the phenomenon that we examine throughout
the paper. We also think that the distance measure contributes something important to the study of
political institutions, as much of what political institutions do is provide a forum for negotiations
over time and this process often produces textual information, which, as we show here, is useful
for comparative research.
4.2 Explanatory Variables
Member State Power: We examine whether or not a country is large in terms of vote share they
have on the Council. If a country had 10 votes on the Council prior to the Nice Treaty, which is
equivalent to having 29 votes after the Nice Treaty, we code this country as “large.” If a country
has fewer than 10 votes on the Council, the country is coded as “small.” Furthermore, as discussed
previously, we also account for whether or not the country is an “in group” or “out group” member,
with Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom coded as “outs” and the other countries coded
as “ins.” In the robustness section, we also examine different voting rules.
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Public Support: As a measure of public support for the European Commission, we measure
a population’s expected favorability towards the European Union as a proxy for domestic support
and thus an indirect measure of the political strength of the European Commission in its ability to
perform its watchdog function. The data that we use is from Euro-barometer. We code the values
for each country in response to the question:
Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on bal-
ance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common
Market)?
The question captures the perceived benefits and costs of EU membership.23 24
Elections: We examine two variables concerning the government’s perspective on the Stability
and Growth Pact. To measure the impact of electoral considerations on a government’s fiscal
policies, we code for the percentage of a given year that precedes an election (Franzese, 2002).
That is, an election held on July 1 would be coded as 0.5 in the same year and 0.5 in the previous
year. As a different specification, we also use the forward version of the variable, which is both
an additional control for endogeneity and well as a test for whether Member State governments
anticipate the effects of a Commission document on later elections.
4.3 Controls
Partisanship: One potentially important consideration that might help explain the impact of do-
mestic politics on Council behavior is partisanship. Grieco, Gelpi and Warren find that shifts
leftward make it less likely that governments comply with legal commitments to capital market
23In a recent working paper Fjelstul and Carrubba (2015) also use Euro-barometer as a proxy for domestic level
public support for the European Commission
24Unfortunately, Eurostat chose not to ask this question in 2012. More on the implications of this for our empirical
model appears below. Also note that audience costs in this way assume that costs are born by forward looking Member
States who are less concerned with reputation and more concerned with winning a larger share the next election. This
seems most appropriate for coalition politics in the EU context.
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integration (Grieco, Gelpi and Warren, 2009). Similarly, the budget balance requirements in the
Stability and Growth Pact could be popular among right-wing governments but not among left-
wing governments. In order to measure this, we employ Benoit and Laver’s left-right partisanship
of the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister for all 15 Member States (Benoit and Laver, 2006)
which appears in Hallerberg and Wehner (2015).
There are a few theoretical concerns with partisanship, however. First, given the presence
of coalition governments in most EU-15 countries that often include parties from both the left
and the right (for example Belgium and Finland), it is hard to envision a clear qualified majority
from one partisan block in place in the Council. Second, the argument does not seem consistent
with the evidence – Germany and the United Kingdom were both left-leaning when the European
Commission suggested concrete recommendations while France and Italy were both right-leaning.
Instead of the partisanship of the government as a whole, however, the partisanship of the Finance
Minister may matter. Because the Finance Ministers are responsible for economic policy (and are
held accountable for their economic policymaking), it is perhaps more likely that partisan concerns
are stronger for the Finance Ministry than the head of the coalition government. In the empirical
analysis, we test this directly by using the partisanship of both the Prime Minister and the Finance
Minister. To offer a preview of the results, we find that neither the partisanship of the Prime
Minister nor the Finance Minister matters; because of this and our theoretical concerns about the
relevance of this variable, we exclude it from the final specifications presented in Tables 2 and 3
(but see the results in the robustness analysis reported in Table A.3).
Economic Performance: In order to test whether or not economic performance matters for
weakening and editing, we collect data on Member State output gaps. In order to be consistent
with the data used by the Commission itself, we use the estimate of the output gap from the Euro-
pean Commission. The output gap measures whether countries are performing better (in terms of
changes in GDP) than potential output (also measured as change in GDP). Countries that report a
positive output gap are growing above potential whereas countries with a negative output gap are
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growing below potential. Note that this is different than actual growth. For example, Ireland and
Germany can have the same growth rate but different output gaps. If Ireland is growing slower
than potential, Ireland will have a negative output gap, whereas if Germany is growing above po-
tential, Germany will report a positive output gap even if the countries exhibit the same economic
growth rate. The potential growth rates are then subtracted from the actual growth rates. We use
this measure of economic performance because the output gap is a key concept in the SGP criteria
applied by the European Commission.
Shared Behavior/Common Shocks: Finally, in order to account for shared common shocks
that may impact Member States in important similar ways, we construct a spline smoother of the
yearly trend for both measures of the dependent variable. A positive coefficient on our shared
Common Shock variable suggests a positive correlation between the likelihood of weakening and
editing when other countries are weakening and editing whereas a negative coefficient estimate
suggests the that countries are not behaving similarly. Again in the case of multilateral institu-
tions, scholars indicate that lax enforcement of rules can lead to bad behavior whereas stricter
enforcement of rules can lead to good behavior (Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher and Vaubel, 2004).25
4.4 Results
Our first set of results examines the weakening the Commission’s recommendations. We want to
test whether Member State power, public support, and elections matter for whether Member States
weaken the Commission’s recommendations.
Because the first measure of our dependent variable, substantive weakening of the Commis-
sion’s assessment criteria, is coded 0 or 1, we use a logit model. As suggested before, we think of
the dependent variable as a latent variable that estimates the probability making the Commission’s
recommendations substantively less stringent for the Member State.
25As a further robustness test, we also include a quadratic time trend to account for the u-shape. We find no
appreciable differences in the results.
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The estimates and the standard errors from the logit model are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3.
The model is a mixed effect glm model that accounts for both time and country random effects.
When we estimate the effects of Member State characteristics on the likelihood of weakening, the
results show that large Member States are also more likely to have the Commission texts written
about them weakened. In particular, holding the other variables at their observed values, the prob-
ability of a weakening increases from .27 to .41 if one moves from a small to a large state. This
provides us with some indication that politically powerful Member States (at least as measured
by votes on the Council) are more likely (or more able) to weaken the Commission’s assessments
against them.
We also find some supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2. The more that the Member State’s
domestic population is euroskeptic, the higher the average number of substantive weakenings to
the Commission’s assessments. A move from the least euroskeptic Member State, Ireland in 1998,
with just 3 percent of the population euroskeptic towards the EU, to the most euroskeptic Member
State, which is Sweden in 2003, where an estimated 59 percent of the population feels skeptical
towards the EU, increases the probability of weakening the European Commission’s recommenda-
tion by almost 50 percent (.48).
We also check whether or not these estimated effects vary by different country characteristics,
as estimates of variables in logit models depend on values of other input variables. In Figure 4, we
show the estimated positive relationship between euroskepticism of the EU and the probability of
weakening the Commission’s recommendations for large and small countries. The x-axis, which
measures euroskepticism, is restricted to the interval where we actually observe data. Large Mem-
ber States or those states with outsized voting power (solid-line) have an estimated higher proba-
bility of weakening than those Member States that do not have such outsized power (dotted-line).
Furthermore, as shown above, countries with euroskeptic domestic populations (or alternatively,
countries where the Commission is likely to have lower support) are more likely to weaken what
the Commission writes about than countries with less euroskeptic domestic populations.
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In terms of our third hypothesis, we find no significant results. We cannot reject the null
that being in an election year has no effect on the probability of weakening the Commission’s
assessments against the Member State. Similarly, we examined different lag structures of when an
election takes place. None of these alternative specifications was statistically significant or affected
the substantive results. In fact, one of our most robust findings is that the election variable is always
indistinguishable from zero and in every model specification when predicting weakening.
There is little evidence that euro “out” countries are less likely to weaken the Commission’s
suggestions–the variable is not statistically significant, although Figure 3 indicates that the esti-
mate is negative. Where a Member State is in its economic cycle also does not have a substantive
impact. We considered several alternatives here to get at the underlining concepts. For economic
performance, the timing could be relevant, and we checked the performance in the previous and
well as current year. We also considered changes instead of levels; if a Member States is expe-
riencing a marked economic slowdown, it may expect a weakened Commission text because of
economic factors. Finally, we find evidence of a positive relationship between higher average val-
ues of weakening and shared common shocks; this provides some indication that Member States
may engage in common behaviors on the Council, where a higher number of changes in texts is
associated with higher editing among the Members in general.
In addition to Member State macro-characteristics, we are also interested in the effects of the
partisanship of the government. Coalition politics in particular make the partisanship explanation
unlikely in the EU context, however, we test for this explicitly. We find a slight negative rela-
tionship between partisanship of the Prime Minister and the probability of weakening, though the
relationship is not significant by traditional cutoff points. Upon further inspection, we also find no
substantive relationship between partisanship and weakening. We also run the same model again
only this time using the partisanship of the Finance Minister. Here we find a slightly stronger nega-
tive result; more right-leaning finance ministers are less likely to weaken the Commission’s report,
however, the results are also insignificant and weak. Therefore, these findings, coupled with our
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null findings for elections, provide no evidence that domestic institutional variables matter. Fur-
thermore, we think that the limited effects of elections and partisanship on predicting whether or
not a Member State will weaken the Commission’s assessment criteria is one of the important
empirical contributions that we uncover using this new dataset.
Our next step is to examine whether the results are similar when we examine editing. We run
the same analysis as before, but, because the edit distance measure is continuous, we use a linear
probability model. As shown in Figure 5, once again, we find that Member States with outsized
voting power are more likely to have a greater number of edits than smaller Member States. A
one-unit increase in Member State size, from Spain to Italy, for example, is associated with ap-
proximately 300 additional edits to the European Commission’s recommendations. Furthermore,
as before, being an “out” Member State is negatively associated with editing, though again, the
sample size makes the uncertainty intervals around the estimate large here as well –“out” countries
are estimated to make on average 100 or so fewer edits than “in” countries, even when we account
for other things that we think are important such as euroskepticism and the country’s economic
conditions. To put this into perspective, this means that, for every year, Euro Member States make
at least 100 more changes to what the “watchdog” writes than countries that are subjected to the
same oversight process but are not subjected to EU level fines, although the uncertainty around the
estimate includes the null hypothesis estimate.
Unlike our previous findings, however, we do not find evidence that euroskeptic countries are
more likely to edit intensively. This finding suggests that euroskeptic countries pursue a strategy of
making substantive changes to the assessment criteria rather than engage in significant editing of
the texts. Perhaps even more importantly, like the above findings, we find no systematic evidence
that domestic institutional variables matter for weakening or editing. For example, we find no
evidence that an election year matters for the number of edits made to the recommendations.26
26Surprisingly, there is some evidence that future elections are negatively associated with editing today but not with
weakening. Future research should try to tease out whether or not this is because the Commission is easier on Member
States.
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Finally, the estimate for common shocks is also positive and significant. As above, these findings
imply that a one unit increase in the average intensity of editing generates additional editing by
other Member States.
In sum, the statistical analysis suggests that large Member States make on average a higher
number of edits and are more likely to weaken the European Commission’s texts about them. In
addition, “out” countries are less likely to change the Commission’s text and make fewer edits.
Member States with relatively more euroskeptic populations are also more likely to weaken text
but interestingly, we do not find any evidence that they systematically edit more than their euro-
positive counterparts. This finding conforms with the theory that euroskeptic Member States have
lower public support for the European Commission, which allows them to more easily weaken the
power of the Commission’s “watchdog function.” It does not, however, explain why euroskeptic
Member States do not try to change the textual information through editing more frequently. Also
important for having confidence in our results is that the substantive interpretation of both the logit
and the linear probability models produce similar findings across model specifications.
4.5 The Euro Crisis
The above analysis suggests that Member States are more likely to weaken when others are weak-
ening and editing more intensively. Furthermore, we might expect that Member State behavior
might be different before and after the euro crisis. During the euro crisis, Member States were en-
couraged by the European Commission to run larger deficits throughout the crisis than before the
crisis. In fact, deficit spending was encouraged by the Commission and, in 2009, the Commission
suggested that Member States should generally spend money to combat the crisis. Therefore, we
expect less oversight during the crisis and therefore less editing and weakening at the end of the
sample period.
We check for differences in the estimated effects before and after the euro crisis by including a
dummy variable for the crisis period (2008-2011). In these tests, we find that Member States are on
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average less likely to make amendments, either weakening or textual changes, though the effects
are insignificant at traditional cutoff levels. The fact that the coefficient is negative conforms to the
decline in the measures of the dependent variables shown in Figure 2.
Another issue may have to do with varying coefficients for the euro crisis and pre-euro crisis
period.27 As our dataset indicates, the number of edits first increases over the period and then
declines. One way to think about this is to consider a simple interaction model. In this case
there are two regimes, where the first set of estimated coefficients reports those periods where
Member States actively try to weaken the Commission’s evaluations, and the second estimated
coefficients reports when Member States do not actively try to edit and weaken the Commission’s
evaluations. We examine this by interacting the crisis variable with the common shock variable.
This gives us a separate effect of the average amounts of weakening and editing conditional on
whether or not we are in the pre-crisis or crisis period. Unfortunately, due to data limitations,
we cannot evaluate the estimated coefficients after the voting reforms in 2011. When we account
for possible variation in the coefficients in this simple way, the variables for political power and
euroskepticism remain stable and significant predictors for weakening. In addition, the crisis year
estimate has a negative, though insignificant, estimated relationship with weakening as before. The
common shock estimate continues to have a positive and significant effect, suggesting that when
the average number of edits increases, weakening increases. This is consistent with our previous
findings. The estimate for the interaction term of crisis and the common shock variable is positive
and insignificant; this suggests that the results hold across the sample broadly.
We also run the same model using the alternative dependent variable, edit intensity. Our find-
ings are similar. Political power remains a positive and significant predictor of edit intensity. The
common shock variable, measuring the trend number of edits, is also positively associated with
27 Johnston, Hancke´ and Pant (2014) argue that the build up to the crisis is about variation in competitiveness rather
than government borrowing or levels of debt. Irrespective of the incentives for why Member States behave this way,
if the mechanisms that we think matters are at work, we would still observe heterogeneity in the ability of Member
States to change the texts.
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edit intensity, again, suggesting that common behaviors may be at work. The crisis variable is
negative though again insignificant by traditional cutoff values. Finally, the interaction between
the crisis years and the trend number of edits is insignificant. These results are shown in Table A.1
4.6 Robustness Checks
This section evaluates whether the estimates reported above are stable in different model specifi-
cations.
Our first set of tests concerns our measure for state power. Instead of operationalizing power
according to whether a given state had 10 votes on the Council under the Pre-Nice Treaty rules,
we create an indicator variable for only France and Germany and rerun the results. We find similar
results (reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix): political power, in this case measured only by
France and Germany, is a strong and stable predictor of textual weakening. We also drop France
and Germany from the sample entirely, and re-run the results using the 13 remaining euro coun-
tries. In this case we find an attenuated relationship between Member State power and weakening,
however, the euroskeptic variable remains stable and significant, as do the other variables. In the
case of predicting editing, even without France and Germany, we find a positive and significant
relationship between Member State power and editing.
We also examine a more nuanced measure of the ability of a given state to change the Com-
mission’s proposed text, which we label “vote blocking.” The four separate voting regimes are de-
scribed above and in the Appendix. The variable represents the blocking percentage a state needs
to attract beside its own vote to prevent the Council from blocking the Commission’s text. France,
for example, needed 17 percent of outstanding votes in 2000 while Finland needed 25 percent to
block a Commission text. Our expectation is that the sign on the variable should be negative. Prior
to 2010, for example, states voted on their own cases, which meant that large states needed fewer
votes than small states. After 2010, states could no longer vote on their case, but only eurozone
countries could vote on other eurozone members. Using the percentage required to block, this
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measure for state power is not significant but the direction of the relationship is as expected. The
euroskeptic variable remains positive and significant for the weakening specification.
In two other specifications, we change the timing for the euroskepticism variable to include the
current year’s level of expressed euroskepticism. As we mentioned above, there is some worry that
the current year’s level may be endogenously related to weakening, however, we use the current
year as a robustness check to confirm that the results are stable. Like the other models, we find
that euroskepticism is a strong predictor of weakening whether we use the current or forward
specification. Furthermore, this remains true whether we specify large country power using only
France and Germany, or the larger sample of countries with voting power above 10.
When we run the results using the dependent variable for editing, however, using only the
France and Germany specification for power, the political power variable is positive but no longer
significant at traditional cutoff points. Thus, there is some evidence that it is not just the behavior
of France and Germany, but the larger sample of countries with voting power in the Council,
that matters. Furthermore, we also test the effects of euroskepticism in the current and forward
versions of the variables on text editing. While the current period is positive, though insignificant
using traditional cutoffs, the future variable is negative. These findings are reported in Table A.1
and Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Instead of being limited to only the EU-15, we also ran the results using an expanded sample
of all EU-27 countries. The results, presented in Table A.3, are consistent with the results from
the restricted sample above. Here we find that countries that are powerful and countries that are
more euroskeptic are also more likely to weaken and edit more intensively. While we think that
the results from the expanded sample are helpful in bolstering our claims, we still believe that the
analysis is most appropriate for the smaller sample of countries, but it is reassuring to find the same
results with an expanded set of countries.
In summary, the results from our robustness analyses are consistent with the evidence that we
provide in the previous section with one exception, namely the relative ability of a state to block a
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Commission change instead of the dummy variable for “large” and “small” Member States is not
significant. This finding is consistent with (Stone, 2011), who notes that the big states get their
way in the European Union regardless of the particularities of the actual voting rules in a given
policy area.
In the other cases, political power is positively associated with weakening and editing. The
level of euroskepticism in the domestic population matters, especially in predicting whether or not
Member States will weaken the Commission’s text. What is perhaps most important is what we
do not find: in none of the specifications do the domestic institutional variables matter. Therefore,
our main empirical finding is that domestic variables, such as elections and the partisans hue of
the government, are not systematically related to observed textual weakening of the Commission’s
evaluations, nor does being in an election year or partisanship predict textual editing. Thus, there
is little evidence that domestic explanations help to explain when and which Member States can
enjoy flexibility in the rules, at least in this context.
Conclusion
This paper explores one mechanism at the European level that was meant to prevent a debt-fueled
crisis in the Eurozone, namely the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We find that Member States
were able to undermine the “watchdog” function of the European Commission in the Council of
Ministers. We test for the determinants of Council changes in Commission assessments using hu-
man coding and automated textual analysis of Commission texts and Council edits. The ability of
large or euroskeptic Member States to amend recommendations generated incentives for Member
States to rewrite Commission criticism of their economic plans. The consequence was that Mem-
ber State behavior systematically eroded the power of the oversight mechanism. This behavior
contributed to the eurocrisis. It eroded the main institutional bulwark at the European Union level
against higher deficits and debts. Of course, it is possible that the Member States would have sim-
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ply ignored tougher language under the “corrective” arm of the Pact, but the general weakening of
the Commission assessments left little scope for testing out the procedures under this part of the
Pact.
Yet, it is not the case that every Member State had equal success in eroding the Pact. Large
states were able to push their weight around. While journalists noted this concerning France and
Germany in 2003, our study indicates that this was a common occurrence over several years.
Moreover, we add an important variable to the debate, namely the opinions of voters concerning
the international institution meant to evaluate the given government’s performance. It suggests
that Member States that want to improve their negotiating outcomes at the European Union level
should encourage more euroskeptic populations at home. This may help to explain, for example,
why we see heads of government making speeches against EU regulations. The ability of the
British government to negotiate a “British Rebate” would arguably fit a model where domestic
euroskeptic appeals are made for Member State gain at the EU level. This finding is not without
qualifications, however. The situation facing the Cameron government before a referendum on EU
membership suggests that this type of strategy has the potential to backfire. A Member State may
be able to get more from an international organization by having a skeptical domestic audience,
yet, being too skeptical may mean foregoing potential benefits if that skepticism ultimately pushes
the given state out of membership in the organization.
Looking forward, one question is whether changes in the framework at the end of 2011, be it
through the “Six Pack,”“Two Pack,” or “Fiscal Compact” will change the patterns we observe in our
study. Take the two main findings in this paper. In terms of euroskepticism, one goal of the Euro-
pean Semester is to increase the involvement of national parliaments as “watchdogs.” Moreover, as
European election results in May 2014 suggested, European populations are even more euroskeptic
than before. This may embolden Member State governments to fight what the Commission says
about them and to work harder to change judgments they find unacceptable. Furthermore, there
is additional evidence that the level of euroskepticism of a domestic population affects the inter-
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action of domestic institutions on the European stage. One recent study, Hallerberg, Marzinotto
and Wolff (2015), finds that more euroskeptic parliaments are also the ones that are engaged in
checking the Commission recommendations. While the actors in this study are parliaments and
not the governments themselves, such evidence suggests that greater euroskepticism may continue
to affect the way that national institutions interact with the institutions of the European Union.
When it comes to large Member States, the relationship that we find in this paper might also
change. We find evidence that a large state is more likely to change the Commission’s document,
and we also do not find an effect of blocking power in our robustness tests, but we have observations
only from 2011 and 2012, and the the rules in place from 2011 require a qualified majority to block
a Commission text rather than a qualified majority to pass it. If the formal rules are all that matter,
this change in the rules should return some power back to the Commission. As (Stone, 2011)
documents, however, large states have outsized influence in international organizations especially
during extraordinary times. Germany has clearly played the type of role Stone describes since the
beginning of the euro crisis, and one would anticipate that it would continue to do so now. If we
combine more euroskeptic populations with German insistence that the rules now be respected,
we would expect increasing tensions on the application of this framework, as we indeed saw in
Summer 2015 with the discussions over the continued fiscal difficulties in Greece. The results of
our paper suggest that effective governance from European Union level institutions will remain
difficult.
An additional surprise is a non-finding – while domestic population preferences seem to influ-
ence the ability of a given government to weaken the Commission’s assessment, upcoming elec-
tions and the partisan hue of the government do not. These results, of course, may be dependent on
the time frame we examine, where there seemed to be little partisan disagreement about the desir-
ability of small budget deficits. The increasingly contentious debates about the limits of “austerity”
packages suggest that partisan differences may become more relevant in the future. Nevertheless,
this non-finding concerning elections and the partisan hue of the government is of interest. Our
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findings suggest that the underlying populations preferences, rather than the government of the
day, is more important in explaining government action at the European level.
Finally, we also show how the use of human coding and computer textual analysis can be
fruitfully employed to measure and analyze important aspects of institutional behavior. This is
important as scholars often pay attention to whether countries comply with the rules without first
uncovering whether, which, and how much countries can use the institutional framework to nego-
tiate the terms even before they make the decision of whether or not to comply. Equipped with
tools that allow for the computation of textual changes, we show how these tools can be used to
build new and domain specific measures. Models similar to the one explored here could also be
extended to account for deliberation and bargaining in committees, such as in legislative or central
bank committees, or as important information that tracks variation in actors’ positions across space
and over time.
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Table 1: Example Coding for Weakening Measure
 Example of Commission and Council Assessments of Stability and Convergence 
Programs 
 
Examples Country and Year Commission Assessment Council Assessment 
No Change Italy (2002-2003) 
8/1/03:"Given Italy's high debt, 
large primary surpluses will be 
required for many years." 
21/1/03: A) "Given Italy's high 
debt, primary surpluses on the 
order of 5% of GDP will have 
to be maintained for many 
years." 
Weakening France (2010-2011) 
6/7/11: Based on the 
assessment of the updated 
stability programme...the 
Council is of the opinion that 
the macroeconomic scenario 
underpinning the budgetary 
projections is too 
favourable….The aim of the 
Renewal of Social Dialogue Act 
and of the 2008 Labour Market 
Modernisation Act was to 
modernise social dialogue and 
to address the issue of labour 
market dualism. However, the 
reform did not tackle 
contractual segmentation 
and generally fell short of the 
measures needed to resolve 
the dualism of the French 
labour market." 
7/12/11:  “Based on the 
assessment of the updated 
stability programme...the 
Council is of the opinion that 
the macroeconomic scenario 
underpinning the budgetary 
projections is C 213/8 Official 
Journal of the European Union 
20.7.2011 EN…..The aim of 
the Renewal of Social Dialogue 
Act and of the 2008 Labour 
Market Modernisation Act was 
to modernise social 
dialogue and to address the 
issue of labour market 
dualism. The latter Act 
notably introduced a new 
procedure for terminating 
permanent contracts by 
mutual agreement (rupture 
conventionnelle) which is 
now increasingly used.” 
Weakening United Kingdom (2004-2005) 
16/2/05: A) "Deficit projections 
to 2006/2007 have been 
revised upward relative to the 
previous update despite an 
essentially unchanged 
macroeconomic outlook, 
while…"  B) Paragraph 
concerning possibility of 
crossing 3% deficit rule (see 
Council cell) C) "For 2004/05, 
evidence of significant progress 
remains unconfirmed in outturn 
data and there is a high degree 
of uncertainty over both 
expenditures and revenues, 
leaving the risk noted above of 
a deficit higher than 3% of 
GDP." 
 A) "Relative to the 2003 
update, deficit projections for 
both this financial year and the 
next have been revised 
upwards; beyond…" B) In a 
paragraph warning of UK's 
potential to break 3% rule, 
Council adds the following 
sentence: "However, given 
the decreased volatility of 
the UK economy in recent 
years and the cautious 
approach on the growth 
assumptions underlying the 
public finance projections, 
the risk appears small in the 
outer years."  C) "There is a 
clear risk that the budgetary 
outcome could be worse than 
projected in the programme in 
the short term." 
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Figure 1: Across Country Average Variation in Editing and Weakening
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Figure 2: Over Time Variation in Average Editing and Weakening by Year
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Table 2: Political Determinants of Weakening and Editing
Dependent variable:
Weakening Editing
generalized linear linear
mixed-effects mixed-effects
(1) (2)
LargeStatet 0.84∗ 307∗∗∗
(0.48) (117)
OutputGapt 0.03 −21
(0.09) (19)
EuroOutt −0.42 −113
(0.57) (123)
Euroskeptict+1 5.37∗∗∗ −248
(2.00) (434)
ElectionY eart −0.22 −9
(0.56) (119)
CommonShockt 5.74∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
(1.19) (0.1)
Intercept −4.48∗∗∗ −75
(0.84) (169)
Observations 209 177
Note: Models include country and year effects ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 3: Political determinants of Weakening from mixed GLM with country and year random
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Table 3: Effects of Financial Crisis on Weakening and Editing
Dependent variable:
Weakening Editing
generalized linear linear
mixed-effects mixed-effects
(1) (2)
LargeStatet 0.84∗ 308∗∗∗
(0.48) (117)
OutputGapt 0.01 −24
(0.10) (21)
OutStatet −0.44 −115
(0.57) (123)
Euroskeptict 5.37∗∗∗ −245
(2.00) (435)
ElectionY eart −0.25 −10
(0.57) (120)
CommonShockt 5.68∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
(1.20) (0.1)
CrisisY eart −0.23 −36
(0.45) (104)
Intercept −4.38∗∗∗ −45
(0.86) (191)
Observations 209 177
Note: Models include country and year effects ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix A
Coding of the Dependent Variables
We construct two dimensions using both human coding and textual analysis techniques. The hu-
man coding follows procedures discussed above. Documents are compared for substantive changes
to the textual draft changes between the Commission’s suggestions and the Council’s amendments.
This approach measures the direction of the recommendation, but does not measure the intensity
or the magnitude of the changes.
In order to examine the intensity, we turn to techniques from computational social sciences.
The machine learning follows the procedures summarized above. We fist compile a list of textual
changes using textual comparison software. We then use an add on package to extract the reported
changes into a metadata file. Using two user made python scripts, we then extract the old text and
new text and, running a levenshtein distance measure using the nltk.metrics package from NLTK,
we then compute the metric for each edit. Finally, we then sum the total number of edits by country
year and use this as a measure of country-year edit intensity.
Voting Rules in the Council of Ministers
The voting rules in the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) are remarkably
complicated for the evaluation of stability and convergence programs. After 2009, they are also
not the same rules as for other types of legislation. Below we summarize the rules and trace what
the voting rules mean for a typical large state like France. In the first, 1998-2002, it is the Treaty
of Amsterdam rules. Under this regime, the largest state has 10 votes and the smallest state has 2
votes. In order for the Commission text to pass, 62 of 87 votes are needed. States can also vote on
their own cases. The second voting regime is from 2003-2008, or under the Treaty of Nice. This
Treaty introduced a so-called “triple majority” as the definition of QMV. As Tsebelis and Yataganas
notes, however, this had the effect of strengthening the Council vis-a-vis the Commission because it
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increased the threshold needed for the Council to get to a qualified majority. In practice, this meant
that it became somewhat easier for a large state to block a given Commission proposal. The next
voting regime is 2009-2010, or Lisbon. Under these rules, the Commission only needs a qualified
majority of the relevant set of Member States’ votes. One major change was that a Member State
did not get to vote on its own case. While this may seem to privilege the Commission, this was
not the case for Eurozone states – only the euro states could vote on their cases, while everyone
voted on the non-euro cases. This meant that the relevant number of votes to see a Commission
proposal blocked for a large Eurozone country like France actually decreased rather than increased,
so France actually had more power than before Lisbon. Finally, another regime was in place as
of 2011. According to these rules a Member State needed a qualified majority to block what the
Commission wants rather than QMV to pass it. It takes a few large states, or a combination of a
large and a few small ones to block changes to the Commission’s texts. Below are details on the
coding:
I. 1998-May 2004
i. A qualified majority required 62 of 87 votes to pass legislation. Member states had between
2 (Luxembourg) and 10 (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) votes.
ii. Note that member states potentially vote on their own cases. This means that the blocking
minority is smaller for large states than for small. France, for example, needs only 15 more
votes. Together with another large state and a medium state (e.g., Greece), it can block
proposed text from the European Commission.
II. May-October 2004
i. Transitional period. Member states continue to have between 2 and 10 votes, 88 out of 124
needed to pass legislation.
III. Nice Treaty: November 2004-November 2009
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i. Have 25 member states until December 2006, then 27 member states.
ii. The vote must come from member states representing 62% of the population.
iii. A triple majority is needed:
- Qualified majority threshold of 72.3% of votes through December 2006, then 73.91%.
- 232 of 321 votes from November 2004 until December 2006.
- 255 of 345 votes from January 2007 until November 2009.
iv. The vote must come from a majority of states.
For the purposes of this paper, we make calculations based on the first threshold only.
Note that member states potentially vote on their own cases. This means that the blocking
minority is smaller for large states than for small. France, for example, needs 62 more votes.
Together with two large states and a small state (e.g., Greece), it can block proposed text
from the European Commission.
IV. Treaty of Lisbon: December 2009-December 2010
i. The size of qualified majority threshold, population and number of state requirements tech-
nically remain the same, but there are important changes to voting for the purposes of this
paper.
ii. First, member states can no longer vote on their cases. The actual QMV is approximately
74% of the remaining member states. Second, everyone votes on the Commission documents
for non-eurozone member states. Only eurozone states may vote on a eurozone member
state.
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iii. The practical consequence is as follows. A blocking minority for a euro out like the United
Kingdom is 83 of 345 votes. A blocking minority for France is 47 of 180 votes. France,
therefore, only needs to find one large state (e.g, Italy), one medium state (e.g., Greece) and
one small state (e.g., Slovakia). Compared to the rules under Nice, therefore, while France
can no longer vote on its case it needs fewer allies to block a Commission text.
V. Reverse Qualified Majority: from 2011
i. The same rules on voting are in place, but now it take a qualified majority to block a Com-
mission text. This significantly increases the threshold. France now needs 137 votes. In
2011 Estonia joined the eurozone, so the required votes increased from 134 to 137.
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Table A.2: Voting Proportion to Block Changes
Weakening Editing
generalized linear linear
mixed-effects mixed-effects
Voting Block Proportion
(1) (2)
V oteBlockingt −0.37 −87
(1.69) (315)
OutGapt 0.04 −17
(0.10) (20)
OutStatet −0.44 −115
(0.62) (146)
Euroskeptict+1 6.37∗∗∗ 96
(2.02) (452)
ElectionY eart −0.24 −11
(0.56) (120)
CommonShockt 5.69∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
(1.21) (0.1)
Intercept −4.44∗∗∗ −61
(1.01) (213)
Observations 209 177
Note: Models include country and year effects ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.3: Robustness Checks for the EU 27
Dependent variable:
Weakening Editing
generalized linear linear
mixed-effects mixed-effects
(1) (2)
LargeStatet 1.01∗∗ 174∗
(0.48) (101)
OutputGapt 0.13∗∗ −7
(0.06) (10)
OutStatet 0.16 −112
(0.43) (78)
Euroskeptict+1 5.03∗∗∗ 376
(1.68) (320)
ElectionY eart −0.12 −142
(0.50) (98)
CommonShockt+1 6.16∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
(1.13) (0.1)
Intercept −4.83∗∗∗ −162
(0.78) (142)
Observations 279 217
Note: Models include country and year effects ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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